Anyone who had fought at Franklin, Tennessee on November 30th, 1864 had seen it all.

By mid December of the same year the exhausted remnants of the now legendary Confederate Army of Tennessee found themselves pitted against Union General George Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland at a near three to one odds favoring the Federals. Dug in on the frozen hillsides for two solid weeks, Hood’s army defied Thomas on a daily basis, daring the Federals to move against them.

“. . . our forces . . . had repulsed the Federals at every point, . . . waving their colors in defiance, crying out to the enemy, "Come on, come on."”
Gen. J.B. Hood

On the afternoon of 16th of December, following two unsuccessful Union advances carried on throughout the early morning hours, Hood’s tattered ranks of Confederate infantry occupying defensive positions south of Nashville received a totally unexpected and nearly fatal blow. To the astonishment of both armies the tide had suddenly and irreversibly turned. Under the force of a sweeping Federal assault aimed at the Confederate left . . . “A portion of our line to the left of the center suddenly gave way, causing in a few minutes our line to give way at all points, our troops retreating rapidly down the Franklin pike."
Gen. J.B. Hood

With that single episode the Confederate Army of Tennessee would receive its most crushing wound, one that not only spelled the end of an army but may well have sounded the death knell for the Southern Confederacy as a whole. With Nashville lost and the Army of Tennessee broken beyond repair the war in the West was concluded. Hood’s advance into Tennessee, conceived in the highest of hopes, had ended in tragic ruin.

Whatever assistance General Robert E. Lee would have expected at the eventual arrival of Hood’s forces to accompany him in Virginia was lost as well. The task of facing the might of Grant’s Union army would now be accomplished without reinforcements.

The war in the Western theatre had come to an abrupt, cruel end.

On the evening of December 16, 1864, subsequent to the Federal breakthrough, the only option remaining to Hood’s army was that of survival. And even that was highly questionable.

In the midst of a driving rainstorm and the darkness of night, the Confederates began pulling back, at the same time attempting to bring renewed order to their scattered ranks. The enemy was closing in quickly. A full retreat, unavoidable and inevitable, loomed before the beleaguered Southerners.

It seemed that everything and everyone had turned against them. As the army began to reform, its ragged remnants abandoned the hills of Nashville, trudging south down the Franklin pike.

Not a man among them who would live through the next two weeks of the most trying moments the Army of Tennessee would ever be called upon to endure, would ever forget those awful days. Not in a thousand lifetimes.

“It must have been a strange, heart-sickening sight to the bewildered women and children lining the gates and porches and windows, as we passed by, to see us so soon retracing our steps, in such a plight. Gazing silently at us, a jostling herd of haggard men, equally silent ourselves, they stood, as column after column went by. What were their thoughts, their feelings? The rain still poured in torrents upon us, more dogged in its pitiless pursuit than the enemy. It still beat us down, as it had been doing day and night, day and night, ever since the day of our defeat, until the drops felt like heavy shot upon our heads. No sound save its merciless pour, and the slushy tramp of that miserable multitude hurriedly wading with bent forms and straining eyes through the freezing mud, and the demonical howl of the ferocious wind.”

- The Civil War Memoir of Phillip Daingerfield Stephenson, D.D., page 340, by P.D. Stephenson, formerly of the 5th Company, Washington Artillery, C.S.A., 1894

“The Winter of 1864-5 was the coldest that had been known for many years. The ground was frozen and rough, and our soldiers were poorly clad, while many, yes, very many, were entirely barefooted… Even the keen, cutting air that whistled through our tattered clothes and over our poorly covered heads, seemed to lash us in its fury.”

- Co. Aytch, page 241, by Sam Watkins, formerly of Co. H, 1st Tennessee Infantry, C.S.A.

The following morning of December 17th, found much of Hood’s army scattered from Brentwood to the outskirts of Franklin, the main body holding intact on the Franklin pike near Brentwood. With General George Thomas’ Federal cavalry divisions (under the command of Maj. General James H. Wilson, an aggressive and determined Federal cavalry officer,) up early and in the saddle, ready to overtake Hood’s slowly moving infantry columns, Hood’s footsore soldiers hadn’t a moment to lose. The alternatives were dreadful. If they could not escape Thomas’ rapidly pursuing army now taking every advantage to overtake them, the Army of Tennessee would eventually be faced with the equally fearsome options of capture or annihilation.

Placing General Stephan D. Lee in command of the Confederate rear guard, Hood directed his dejected, crestfallen army southward toward the battle scarred town of Franklin, retracing their steps of weeks previous.

“Many were ill-clad and unshod – some with their feet wrapped with pieces of blanket – some actually bleeding tramping on the frozen ground. On this retreat came the sternest trials of the war.”

- essay by Luke W. Finlay, formerly of the 4th Tennessee Infantry, C.S.A., page 191, as published in Military Annals of Tennessee, by John Berrien Lindsley, 1886

“When a child we shed tears when reading of Washington at Valley Forge; of his men leaving bloody tracks in the snow. Little then did we dream that we would witness similar scenes. The sufferings and hardships endured by Hood’s army on its retreat were greater than any endured by our revolutionary forefathers. We cannot even now think of them without emotion. Hundreds made the march with clothing hardly sufficient to hide nakedness, barefooted, or with their feet wrapped in an old rag or piece of blanket. The winter was intensely cold, the ground frozen, hard and stiff. Almost every step tore and bruised their feet, whilst many did in reality leave a bloody track every time they put their feet down from Columbia to the Tennessee River. We saw numbers of privates and some officers trudging along with feet as bruised and bloody almost, as of beef steak and swollen twice their natural size. That they could even stand was a mystery to us. Others had wounds bleeding and sore, with nothing to eat.” – Sumner A. Cunningham, formerly of the 41st Tennessee Infantry, C.S.A., page 112, Reminiscences of the 41st Tennessee, 1872

December 17th. 1864 marked a day like no other for the Army of Tennessee. On this, the first day of the army’s full retreat from Tennessee to the border of Alabama, four separate engagements would take place between the Confederate rear guard and Wilson’s cavalry, each encounter a deadly, brutal affair. With the Southern army in retreat and badly demoralized, George Thomas’ relentless pursuit would not cease until he had either surrounded them and cut off their escape or subdued them by force. The next ten days would be a duel like no other. Hood’s retreat would consist of a running battle over a distance of one hundred miles, as the Army of Tennessee fought for its very survival each tortuous step of the way.

The first of these bloody clashes would occur in the northern portion of Williamson County, Tennessee in the first hour of daylight on December 17, 1864, in a narrow pass through which the Franklin Pike runs, called “Hollow Tree Gap.” The Confederate rear guard appointed to cover the army’s initial withdrawal, and which played a prominent role throughout that first day, was comprised of elements of Lieutenant General S.D. Lee’s Corps: specifically men of Brigadier Generals Randal Gibson’s and James Holtzclaw’s Brigades of Major General Henry Clayton’s Division. The majority of these men hailed from the States of Alabama and Louisiana.
Substantial losses were suffered on both sides of the fight that occurred at Hollow Tree Gap, nevertheless a precious couple of hours were secured for the Confederate advance to make their way southward.

At first light on the Franklin pike that morning, elements of the Federal cavalry brigades of Brig. General Joseph Knipe’s Seventh Division advanced in a furious charge directly down the center of the pike, heading straight for the trailing ranks of Hood’s main body, the 19th Pennsylvania and 10th Indiana leading the column, where, in the words of a US cavalryman from the Fourth Tennessee, “a considerable fight ensued.”

Wilson’s horsemen . . . “pushing on in vigorous pursuit [down the Franklin pike], came up with the enemy just beyond Brentwood, [and] drove him back to Hollow Tree Gap, four miles north of Franklin, where he made a stand. General Knipe attacked with the main part of the brigade, while General Hammond, with the balance, turned the position and attacked the rebels in flank. About 250 prisoners and 5 battle flags were taken…” – No. 194, Report of Brevet Major General James H. Wilson, U.S. Army, commanding Cavalry Corps.

What the overly zealous Wilson had not counted on was the fact that, although humiliated and in retreat, the Confederate army was far from defeated. Under the command of Gen. S.D. Lee, the Confederate rear guard had been posted at Hollow Tree Gap. When Wilson moved out, S.D. Lee’s men were waiting for him. As Knipe’s brigades came into view, a murderous volley was unleashed in their faces, forcing them to turn aside into the adjoining fields.

“Early on the morning of the 17th our [Confederate] cavalry was driven in confusion by the enemy, who at once commenced a most vigorous pursuit, his cavalry charging at every opportunity and in the most daring manner. It was apparent that they were determined to make the retreat a rout if possible. Their boldness was soon checked by many of them being killed and captured [at Hollow Tree Gap] by Pettus’ [Alabama] and Stovall’s [Georgia] brigades and Bledsoe’s battery, under General Clayton. Several guidons were captured in one of their charges.” – Report of Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee, C.S. Army

Although the confrontation at Hollow Tree Gap decided nothing in terms of winning or losing, it most certainly knocked the wind out of the Federal cavalry’s presumption that the wholesale capture of the “rebels” would be accomplished with little effort. According to the testimony of one Federal cavalryman, the bloody occurrence at Hollow Tree Gap had brought the Federals to their senses. No doubt it was a solemn portent of what they could expect, time and again throughout the coming ten days of fighting.

“At Hollow Tree Gap a considerable body of [Confederate] infantry were strongly posted, who repulsed the two [Union cavalry] regiments in front with the loss of 22 killed and wounded and 63 prisoners, principally from the 10th Indiana. To offset this, the 10th had captured two colonels, two lieutenant colonels, one major and more than one hundred enlisted men. The 9th [Indiana Cavalry] being in the rear, had all the morning seen the evidences of the demoralization of the enemy. The guns and other equipment strewn along the road, the apparent abandonment of everything that impeded their flight, every door yard filled with illy-clad shivering prisoners, had led us to the conclusion that we had a ‘walk over.’ Hollow Tree Gap undeceived is.”

For the remainder of those difficult days lying just ahead, there would be no doubt among the Federals that the work would be demanding and hazardous, and that the fighting would be of the severest kind. Hollow Tree Gap had taught them a bitter lesson.

Following the stand at Hollow Tree Gap, another encounter, more desperate and costly took place at the crossing of the Harpeth River, just north of the town of Franklin, where the lives of many were offered at the water’s edge, in order to buy more time for the main body of Hood’s army to safely cross over into Franklin and beyond. The scene there, on the banks of the Harpeth, defies description.

The weather was atrocious. A chilling rain was falling, further swelling the river beyond its muddy banks. The Confederate rear-guard, burdened with the overwhelming task of keeping the enemy at bay, dug in on the northern bank of the river and prepared to fight to the bitter death.

Shortly, upon the same hill top from which Bledsoe’s Confederate Cannon fired off a few earlier parting shots, the Federal advance, of Hammond’s First Brigade of Knipe’s Seventh Division, formed in line of battle. The Confederate rear guard, hidden from view, waited at the river’s edge.

When the Federals closed within several hundred yards, Confederate artillery (believed to be of Bledsoe’s Missouri Battery, C.S.A.) again opened on them with double-shotted canister, literally beheading many horses and virtually vaporizing their Federal riders. Suddenly, seemingly out of nowhere, Confederate Cavalrymen burst upon the scene in an infuriated assault with sabers slashing and pistols blasting. Shivering southern infantrymen took careful aim and fired, again and again, as column after column of blue-clad cavalrymen closed in on their position. Confederate Engineers, in order to stall the Union advance, quickly burned the nearby trestle bridge, leaving numerous Confederates stranded on the northern bank. Facing the onrushing columns of Wilson’s cavalry, their alternatives were pitifully few. They could either surrender, or attempt an escape through the chilling Harpeth River. Unfortunately, many were simply killed or captured while endeavoring to flee the area. Some, too weak to continue, were literally trampled in the muddy river banks by the pursuing Federal Cavalry. The battle was over in probably less than thirty minutes. As expected, the Federals would quickly reform and continue their dogged pursuit. Crossing at some shallower points over river both above and below Franklin, Wilson’s cavalry immediately formed by brigade and charged through town. But the southerners had held valiantly before offering up their lives or surrendering, as the vanguard of their army gained precious time and distance ahead of their northern foe.

As the days progressed, fierce fighting would erupt along the pike in various locations along the route from Nashville to Alabama, each encounter critical to the survival of Hood’s forces. If the rear guard should ever face defeat, precious little could be done to stop Thomas from overtaking the remainder of the Confederate army.

To the everlasting honor of that small band of Confederate cavalry and infantry, the crossing of the Tennessee River into safety was soon accomplished. But not without the most precarious series of events.

The retreat of Hood’s army from Nashville, commencing on the 17th of December unto the 27th would be remembered by those who participated in it as the most difficult and perilous period of its history. Barely a step ahead of Thomas’ hard pursuit, the Confederates would fight their way out of Tennessee on a daily and often hourly basis, fending off unrelenting, vicious Union cavalry advances, fording icy streams and plowing through waist deep rivers of ice-crusted mud, enduring the worst that man and nature could array against them with little or nothing to eat and no hope of supplies, ammunition, or clothing.

Had it not been for the indomitable Confederate rear guard composed of Lee’s Corps, Forrest’s cavalry, and Walthall’s skilled infantry brigades, Hood’s army may well have perished somewhere in middle Tennessee.

To view the latest updated record of casualties that occurred during Hood’s retreat, see

Casualty List.

(The Casualty List, updated and revised as needed, is posted courtesy of David Fraley, noted military historian and curator at the Carter House, Franklin, TN. As Mr. Fraley is solely responsible for its content he retains exclusive copyright to the published material.)