BATTLE OF FRANKLIN
Williamson County
(Hood's 1864 Tennessee Campaign)
November 30, 1864
Following the controversial events at Spring Hill, Tennessee on November 29, 1864, where two of Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield's Federal infantry corps managed to narrowly escape a well devised trap laid by General John B. Hood's Army of Tennessee, both armies moved northward to Franklin, Tennessee.
Just before sunrise on November 30, advance elements of the two Federal infantry corps arrived in Franklin. Behind them, stretched out for over seven miles along the Columbia-to-Franklin Pike, were the 800 wagons of Federal ordnance and supplies. Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner's division, of Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley's Fourth Army Corps, had suffered the most casualties at Spring Hill. Despite this, it was Wagner's division that was acting as rear-guard for the wagon train. Wagner's 1st Brigade, commanded by Col. Emerson Opdycke, had been skirmishing with the Confederate cavalry of Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest the entire ten miles from Spring Hill to the outskirts of Franklin.
When Forrest's troopers were within two miles south of Franklin, they met with heavy resistance from four Federal brigades and a section of artillery. Two of these brigades, Opdycke's and Walter C. Whitaker's brigade of Kimball's division were holding Winstead Hill west of the pike. Wagner's two reserve brigades had stopped for breakfast on Breezy Hill, east and across from Winstead Hill. Forrest's men could do little against the long line of infantry in his front but continue to skirmish from long range.
Upon reaching Franklin, Schofield received several messages from Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, in Nashville. Sent on the 29th, one message gave Schofield permission to cross the Harpeth and retire to Nashville if necessary. However, a second message instructed Schofield to cover his wagon trains and take position at Franklin. But Schofield had no intentions of staying in Franklin to confront Hood again if he could help it. Although he had requested that Thomas send the pontoons to Franklin as early as November 28, he found they had not arrived by the 30th. If the Union forces were to get across the Harpeth they would have to construct bridges to do so. It was decided that the burned out Wagon Bridge would be rebuilt and the narrow Railroad Bridge replanked. While engineers set to work on the bridges, the Federal artillery began crossing the Harpeth at various fords. By noon much of the construction was completed and the 800 wagons began crossing.
On the southern perimeter of the town existed parapets from the Union's previous occupation of Franklin in early 1863. Federal infantry began rebuilding and strengthening these works as soon as they arrived. From east of the main Columbia-to-Franklin Pike to the Harpeth River, a continuous line of breastworks, curving in an arc, were soon constructed. Just to the east of the main pike lay the cotton gin of Fountain B. Carter. Due to the strategic location of the cotton gin, a salient was constructed in the breastworks. From here, the entrenchments swung sharply northwest, crossing the Columbia pike. The Lewisburg Pike, which also approached the town from the south, was located just west of the Harpeth River. From this pike to the river, the Federals constructed their breastworks of hedges of Osage orange. These thorny trees formed a natural abatis on the outside of the parapets, making this portion of the line very formidable.
In the center of the Union line, forty-five feet west of the Columbia pike, the Carter home occupied a prominent hill. Where the road passed over the Carter hill, a gap was left in the line to allow the army and wagons to pass through. It was here that Federal General Jacob D. Cox had his men construct a second line of breastworks in the rear of the first, which passed along the northern boundary of the Carter's garden. This line of works extended west then northwest about three-quarters of a mile, terminating at the Carter's Creek pike.
By 2:00 P.M.. most of the breastworks were complete and exhausted Federal soldiers collapsed for a rest. But the earlier issue of a whiskey allowance was an ominous sign, and most of the soldiers knew they were probably in for a hot time of it. Even Schofield's disposition had much improved after an hour and a half nap, despite another message from Thomas asking Schofield, "Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin for three days longer?" Schofield had sent a reply: "I do not believe I can." And with this, had ordered his troops to begin their withdrawal from Franklin at nightfall.
John Bell Hood had awoken on the morning of November 30, to find the Federal army had slipped through his grasp in the middle of the night. Initially dumbfounded, Hood then became angry, making his wrath known to his subordinates during a breakfast at the Nathaniel Cheairs home on the Columbia pike.
* Many Historians have stated that all of Hood's generals were present at this breakfast. But in fact, first-hand accounts indicate that only Gov. Isham Harris, S. D. Lee, Cheatham, and staff officers were present. General Forrest was said to have stopped briefly for a few words with Hood. Accounts also state that Hood addressed the troops of Ed Johnson's Division from the north balcony of the Cheairs' home.
According to accounts by General Stephen D. Lee, who had arrived from Columbia around 9 A.M., Hood censured Cheatham for failure to gain possession of the Franklin Pike and block Schofield's way. Cheatham in turn blamed Generals Brown and Cleburne. Despondent over the turn of events, Hood returned Ed Johnson's division to Lee's Corps, stating that he did not think Schofield would stop short of Nashville. He then ordered S. D. Lee to allow his corps to rest before closing up with the rest of the army.
As the Confederates moved northward, with Alexander P. Stewart's Corps in the lead, evidence of a quick flight by the Union army began to bolster the spirits of the Confederates in pursuit. The Franklin Pike was littered with equipment, dead mules and burned wagons. There was also Union stragglers that had been unable to keep up with the main column, which were captured during the pursuit.
By early afternoon, General Hood's mood had changed as well. Receiving word from the advance column that Schofield's men were still in Franklin but could be seen frantically trying to cross the Harpeth River, he believed that one more opportunity existed to keep Schofield from reaching Thomas at Nashville. At approximately 2: 30 P.M., Hood held a conference at the Harrison home, which stood one-half mile south of Winstead Hill. Asking his subordinates their opinion, it is said that generals Cleburne, Cheatham and Forrest advised against an attack. Forrest wanted one more opportunity to attempt to flank the Federals.
There is evidence that Hood considered the option of a flanking movement. According to corps commander, A. P. Stewart, Hood asked if he thought he could get his corps north of the Harpeth. When Stewart answered in the affirmative, Hood directed him to "send some cavalry and infantry to drive the Federals out of a bend in the Harpeth to the south of the town, and to await further word." ["Soldier of Tennessee" - Sam Elliot]
While Stewart's Corps moved around Breezy Hill, attempting to screen their movements in the dense woods that ran around it's base, Hood was given a captured dispatch from Thomas to Schofield. This dispatch, according to Hood, gave permission for Schofield to fall back to the north side of the Harpeth if he felt he could not stop the Confederate army.
From atop Winstead Hill, Hood had clearly seen the chaos in Franklin, where some portions of the Federal army had already crossed the Harpeth. It was at this time that Hood must have made his decision to attack immediately. Calling his officers together, he issued orders to that affect. It is certain that Hood realized darkness would be coming soon, and with it would be lost any chance for a delaying action. S. D. Lee's Corps, and the artillery, were still miles behind and would take hours to get into position. When the Confederates had approached the two hills, the Union soldiers had retreated. In Hood's memoirs "Advance and Retreat," Hood ascertained that the Federal army was merely making an appearance of holding ground while attempting to rapidly retreat. And though the works appeared formidable, he also knew that Schofield had had little time to strengthen them.
* Many authors and Historians speculate and even outright accuse Hood of the desire to punish his army for the events at Spring Hill. There are no first-hand accounts that indicate this was the case, rather the idea that Hood would wage a battle for this express purpose is absurd. Furthermore, Historians claim that it was no accident that Cheatham's Corps, and Cleburne's Division, was to attack in the center of the Union lines. However, they fail to make the point that Stewart's Corps was in the lead during the pursuit, and it was only logical that it be the corps to form on the right flank of the Confederate line. Additionally, Cleburne's Division was well known as one of the hardest fighting divisions of the army. It would only stand to reason that Hood might want one of his best divisions placed at what appeared to be the strongest portion of the Federal line.
Hood himself stated his reasons for risking a frontal assault, saying he would rather fight the Federals at Franklin, where they had only hours to fortify, than Nashville where they had been erecting defenses for three years.
While the Federal works looked strong, there appeared to be one important and tactical flaw. Union division commander, George D. Wagner, had ordered his three brigades to hold an advance position, straddling the Columbia-Franklin Pike, and a half-mile in front of the main Federal line. Colonel Opdycke refused to obey Wagner's order, and be placed in such an exposed position, continuing his march to within the main Federal line. The two remaining forward brigades, Lane's and Bradley's (now commanded by Col. Joseph Conrad), would almost prove fatal for the Union army, and allow the Confederate attack to initially break through the center.
Schofield, recalling the narrow escape at Spring Hill, took measures to protect against another flanking movement, which is what he clearly expected his former West Point classmate to do. He sent an infantry brigade of Wood's division to relieve the cavalry guarding Hughes Ford on the Harpeth, and to contest any advance of the enemy. With three hours of daylight remaining, Schofield allowed his men to rest and await their withdrawal of Franklin at 6: P.M. So sure was Schofield that Hood would not attack his position, that he had not even bothered to inspect the fortifications. Hood had managed to catch Schofield off guard once more.
At 2:45 P.M., Confederates began to mass at the foot of Winstead and Breezy Hill. An observer wrote that the columns resembled "a living wall of men and glistening steel." Over 20,000 Confederates, eighteen brigades in all, moved into battle formation across the open valley floor. Hood's plan was to advance along the three major routes leading into the town. Forrest's Cavalry was divided, with Jackson and Buford on the right flank and Chalmers on the left, advancing up the Carter's Creek Pike. Cheatham's Corps would attack the center, where the Columbia Pike ran into Franklin between the Carter House and the Carter Cotton gin. Stewart's Corps would advance along the Lewisburg Pike, which ran north then north-westerly into the town, and parallel to the Harpeth River.
Due to the converging necessary as they reached the Union lines, Hood ordered his divisions to march with a two-brigade front, the third being in the rear and ready for support. However, Cleburne requested and received permission to form his division in brigade columns to present a narrower front.
At 4 P.M., with a skirmish line 200 yards in front, the Confederates surged forward. With their colorful battle flags waving in the breeze, and their regimental bands playing "Dixie" and "The Bonnie Blue Flag," they presented an awesome spectacle that would long be remembered. One Federal soldier remarked that the gray line shook the ground and moved "with the speed of an avalanche." So impressive was the sight that the surprised Union soldiers were transfixed by it, with the exception of Lane's and Conrad's men who pleaded to be allowed to retreat to the main lines.
Despite animated pleadings, General George D. Wagner became furious, ordering that the men of these two brigades should be held in their position by bayonet if necessary. Wagner would not have a repeat of Bradley's route at Spring Hill. Additionally, it was reported that the Union general had been nipping at the flask through out the afternoon.
When Cleburne and Brown's divisions were within firing range, the two exposed brigades unleashed a volley that only checked the Confederates momentarily. Soon outflanked on their right and left, Wagner's men turned to run for their lives. With the fleeing Union soldiers becoming intermingled with the advancing Confederates, the men behind the breastworks were unable to fire for fear of killing their own men. As Confederates rushed up and onto the breastworks, a deadly volley from the other side took a heavy toll on them. But eventually the Union line in the center began to crack then break. Besides the twelve regiments of Conrad's and Lane's brigades, three of Cox's regiments and two others in reserve began to flee away from the oncoming gray tidal wave. Cleburne's Division had pierced the center of the Federal line and gained the momentum. This was the most critical point of the battle, when the outcome could have gone either way. That portion of the earthworks now held by Confederates was closer to the two vital bridges than either flank of the Union army.
Two hundred yards north of the Carter House, Opdycke's brigade had been resting when suddenly Cox's and Wagner's men came running towards them with the Confederates right behind. When Opdycke saw his line begin to waver, he made the decision to consolidate his regiments all on the east side of the road "for greater security to the men." When this movement was misconstrued by some as an advance, Opdycke tried to stop his men. But the din of battle was too loud, the Opdycke was soon caught up in the onrush of forward movement.
Initially, the Federals rushing forward to the parapets ran smack into Wagner's men. Behind Wagner's men, soldiers of Cleburne's and Brown's divisions were giving chase and yelling at the top of their lungs. With a loud impact, the Federal and Confederate lines collided in the yard of the Carter House. Hand-to-hand battle broke out in a wild melee, as both sides fought for contested ground.
Though Opdycke's men succeeded in gaining control of the inner breastworks, the Confederates still held about 200 yards of the outer works. From here, they fired at the Union lines across the Carter house garden and behind a rail fence. The ground between the two sides was a deadly space, one which the Confederates made at least thirteen desperate charges over but to no avail.
On the Confederate right, A. P. Stewart's Corps advanced on three infantry brigades of Reilly's division. When within one thousand yards of the Federal line, the advancing columns were met by a thunderous fire from nearby Fort Granger. Moving in closer, large gaps were torn in their lines by the grape and canister of Reilly's artillery. But on they came at a dead run until suddenly they were brought up short by a barrier in front of the Union works. It was the sharp and thick branches of osage orange that blocked their paths. There was nowhere to go and no way to get through this thick tangle to reach the main Union works, rising up defiantly behind the osage. It wasn't long before the Confederate dead thickly carpeted the ground in front of this barrier, and those who did make it over were killed or captured.
As darkness fell over the battlefield at Franklin, sporadic fire along the lines could be heard amidst the groans of the wounded and dying. The last attack to take place was at 9 P.M. when Ed Johnson's Division advanced towards the center of the battlefield by torchlight. They would reach to within thirty paces of the Union line before a wall of flames erupted in their front. This was the last concerted effort against the enemy lines, both sides having exhausted themselves beyond endurance.
