The Army Of Tennessee:
The 1864 Tennessee Campaign
"Darkest Of All Decembers" by artist Rick Reeves
By early 1864 the desire to recover Tennessee had been a long stated priority of the Confederate government. Jefferson Davis wrote in his post war memoirs, "General (Joseph) Johnston entered upon his third command-that of the army designed to recover the State of Tennessee from the enemy. In February, 1864, he was informed of the policy of the Government for his army. It was proposed to reinforce him largely, and that he should advance at once and assume the recovery of at least a part of the State of Tennessee." Johnston would not recover any part of Tennessee, and in 1864 would yield Georgia to the conquering Union armies as well.
After the fall of Atlanta in September 1864, Army of Tennessee commander General John Bell Hood, who had replaced Johnston in July, moved his army to the west and south of Atlanta, camping near the town of Palmetto. While visiting the army there on Sept. 26, Jefferson Davis exhorted the Tennessee troops. "Be of good cheer, for within a short while your faces will be turned homeward and your feet pressing Tennessee soil." This was the first hint of Davis' impending plan for the long desired recovery of Tennessee.
During October, 1864, Hood campaigned in northwest Georgia and northeast Alabama, harassing General William T. Sherman's tenuous single supply line, attempting to draw him out of Atlanta for a decisive battle. Sherman however, remained in and around the city, ultimately opting for its abandonment, eventually commencing his "March to the Sea" on November 16. With Sherman refusing to be lured away from Atlanta, Hood consulted with his immediate superior General P. G. T. Beauregard on October 20 in Gadsden, Alabama, and it was decided that an invasion of Tennessee would be immediately conducted.
With Robert E. Lee's beleaguered Army of Northern Virginia under relentless pressure from Ulysses S. Grant in Virginia, and Abraham Lincoln's reelection, all Confederate hopes for a negotiated peace with the United States were dashed. The Confederacy was desperate. In a letter dated Dec. 6, 1864, Beauregard wrote to President Jefferson Davis, explaining the rationale for the campaign into Tennessee:
Augusta, Georgia, Dec. 6, 1864
"To His Excellency, Jefferson Davis,
President Confederate States.
"...I did not countermand the campaign in Tennessee to pursue Sherman with Hood's army for the following reasons:
"1st. The Roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa River across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been, by the prevailing heavy rains, rendered almost impassable to artillery and the wagon trains.
"2nd. General Sherman, with an army better appointed, had already the start about two hundred seventy five miles on comparatively good roads. The transfer of Hood's army into Georgia could not have been more expeditious by railway than by marching through the country, on account of the delays unavoidably resulting from the condition of the railroads.
"3rd. To pursue Sherman, the passage of the Army of Tennessee would, necessarily, have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a devastated country, affording no subsistence or forage; and, moreover, it was feared that a retrograde movement on our part would seriously deplete the army by desertions.
"4th. To have sent off the most or the whole of the Army of Tennessee in pursuit of Sherman, would have opened to Thomas's force the richest portion of the State of Alabama, and would have made nearly certain the capture of Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.
"...Under these circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas's army and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defense of Kentucky and, perhaps, Ohio, and thus prevent him from reinforcing Grant. Meanwhile, supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited resources.
"I remain very respectfully, your obedient servant.
"P. G. T. Beauregard, General."
In late October the preliminary movements for the invasion of Tennessee were under way. Sherman, learning of Hood's threat to Tennessee and Kentucky through newspapers and other intelligence reports, dispatched General George Thomas to Nashville, and sent General John Schofield to organize defenses in eastern Tennessee in order to protect Chattanooga and Knoxville. Hood meanwhile, sought to march directly on middle Tennessee, hoping to engage either Schofield or Thomas before their forces could converge.
From the onset of the campaign, the Confederate march was plagued with extraordinary difficulty. Hood's march into Tennessee was first delayed by the lack of sufficient numbers of cavalry on hand. While General Joseph Wheeler's cavalry units were ordered by Beauregard to remain around Atlanta to harass Sherman, General Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry was raiding Federal installations in western Tennessee, near Jackson. Hood pushed northwest along the Tennessee River, looking for a favorable crossing point, awaiting Forrest. Learning of these movements, Sherman ordered Schofield to move his Federal corps from Chattanooga to Nashville.
Hood lost even more time at Florence and Tuscumbia, Alabama. A month earlier he had requested that the Memphis and Charleston Railroad be repaired from Corinth, Mississippi to Tuscumbia to receive supplies, but this had not been done. With warm October days giving way to persistent November rains, rivers became swollen and the days grew shorter. It was not until November 14 that Forrest's cavalry arrived, and the next day the Army of Tennessee began its arduous crossing of the Tennessee River. On November 21, the entire army was moving north.
The immediate goal of the Confederate invasion of Tennessee was to overtake and cut off Schofield's 20,000 Federal troops before he could reinforce Thomas's Nashville garrison, then numbering about 19,000.
On November 22, advance units of Hood's forces reached Lawrenceburg, about 20 miles west of Schofield's troops, then camped in Pulaski. Greatly alarmed, Schofield moved his troops rapidly northward toward Columbia, where he succeeded in seizing the fords and bridges across the Duck River just before the arrival of Forrest's cavalry. Had Forrest beaten the Federals to Columbia, Schofield would have been cut off from Thomas, and almost certainly destroyed by Hood's 33,000 Confederates. In control of Columbia, Schofield then quickly erected temporary breastworks.
Read More In-Depth Account of Hood at Columbia
Here Hood devised a flanking plan which worked perfectly. Rather than attack the temporary breastworks at Columbia, Hood left General Stephen D. Lee's Corps to demonstrate before Schofield, and moved the rest of the army across Davis? Ford, five miles above Columbia, then marched hurriedly toward Spring Hill, eleven miles to the north along the road to Nashville. Schofield's main body of troops remained in Columbia, where Lee's artillery thundered, creating the illusion that Hood's entire army was still there. Schofield dispatched only 5,000 troops under Stanley, along with supply wagons, to Spring Hill.
General Benjamin F. Cheatham's Corps, marching north along the Franklin-Nashville Pike, arrived in Spring Hill at about 3:00 P.M., with Hood at the head of the column. With inconclusive skirmishing taking place during the late afternoon, Stewart's Corps arrived around 5:30 P.M.. At this point, approximately 20,000 Confederates confronted only 5,000 Federals under Stanley, while Schofield's remaining troops marched north from Columbia. Hood's maneuver had worked perfectly, the Confederate army was now positioned both in front of and behind Schofield, cutting off the Union escape to Nashville.
At Spring Hill one of the greatest mysteries of the Civil War occurred. Although information is incomplete, and often conflicts, a breakdown occurred in the Confederate command which allowed Schofield's main force to march within a hundred yards of the bivouacked Confederates during the night, and escape. Hood had given orders to Cheatham to attack Stanley's outnumbered and disorganized Federals, and seize the Columbia Pike. Cheatham ordered Cleburne's division to attack, and in the midst of the assault, apparently ordered them to cease the attack. Then later, with Major General William Bate's division having been ordered by Hood to engage the approaching main body of Schofield's army, Cheatham ordered Bate to move to a position that effectively left the road open. Other divisions of Stewart's Corps arrived throughout the night, and although some 20,000 Confederate troops bivouacked that night, none were on the single road from Columbia to Spring Hill. Schofield and Stanley's entire army passed quietly past the sleeping Confederates, and moved northward through Spring Hill, toward the town of Franklin.
The following excerpt from "The Sound of Brown's Guns, The Battle of Spring Hill, Nov. 29, 1864" by Alethea Sayers, details the breakdown in Confederate command in Spring Hill, allowing Schofield's escape to Franklin during the night of Nov. 29, 1864:
Approximately one mile south of Spring Hill, on the Rally Hill Pike, while wading across Rutherford Creek, Hood issued his first orders to Generals Cheatham and Cleburne to "attack the enemy at once, vigorously and get possession of the pike..." Hood then outlined his battle plan, and instructed Cheatham to hurry along the men crossing the creek, while he rode ahead with Cleburne's Division. At 3: 45 P.M., Cleburne's Division aligned themselves along the Rally Hill Pike, facing east, and on the southern outskirts of Spring Hill. Three-quarters of a mile east, and on the back side of a large knoll, was the vital Franklin Pike, which the Confederates needed possession of. After personally supervising Cleburne's advance, Hood rode back to find Cheatham and bring up his two remaining divisions, those of John C. Brown and William B. Bate. Hood did not see Cheatham, however he did find Bate's Division standing alongside Rally Hill Pike awaiting orders. He directed Bate to move his division east towards the Franklin Pike and support Cleburne's left. Cleburne's attack was initially successful, driving a brigade of Wagner's division, Stanley's corps, back to the southern outskirts of the town. But the attack was stalled by Union artillery, which had been placed on an elevation to the right and left of the pike. While reforming to renew his attack, Cheatham arrived on the field and ordered Cleburne to await the arrival of Brown's Division to support Cleburne's right.
Brown's Division was in place by 4:45 P.M., and could plainly see Lane's Federal brigade in their front. In the process of sending skirmishers forward, General Brown received a message that the Union line in his front overlapped his line on the right. Brown decided to suspend his forward movement until he could advice Cheatham of this fact. But Cheatham had ridden off to find Bate's Division and bring them into line. Despite repeated urgings from his officers, Brown refused to move forward until his right flanks could be supported.
It was shortly after 5 P.M. when Bate's sharpshooters reached the Columbia-Franklin Pike. They began firing on Union soldiers that were moving south towards Spring Hill. This is where a member of Cheatham's staff found them when he delivered Cheatham's order to pull back from the pike and connect with Cleburne's right. In disbelief, General Bate initially refused to obey the order, as he was doing exactly what General Hood had told him to do. But after sending a courier to find Hood and verify the new orders, Bate did manage to pull him men back and extend his right to connect with Cleburne's left. It was now 9 P.M., and Bate's Division went into bivouac just to the north of the Cheairs Plantation, less than 100 yards from the pike.
General Cheatham had ridden back to Brown's position at 5:30 P.M. to find the Confederate attack stalled. When Brown explained his decision, Cheatham concurred with Brown, stating that he would report the situation to General Hood and bring up A.P. Stewart's Corps to support Brown's exposed right flanks.
Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart's Corps, consisting of 8,000 men, had been ordered to remain on the south side of Rutherford Creek until he was brought forward at 5:30 P.M. Coming across Hood at 6:15, Hood directed his corps to move north of Spring Hill and place themselves across the Columbia Pike. Hood further explained that this movement would place Stewart behind Cheatham's Corps but his right would extend beyond Cheatham's. It was apparent by these instructions that Hood was uninformed of Cheatham's change in position, as Brown's right was now angling away from the Columbia Pike. Stewart recalled that Hood was very agitated and concerned over not hearing sounds of battle.
Shortly after Stewart's Corps advanced northward on a country lane that ran just parallel to Rally Hill Pike, an irate Hood greeted Cheatham. "Why in God's name have you not attacked the enemy and taken possession of the pike?"
Cheatham explained Brown's situation and requested that Stewart be brought up to support Brown's right flank. Witness to this exchange between Hood and Cheatham, Captain Joseph Cummings got the distinct impression that Cheatham thought it would be folly to initiate a night attack. However, Hood was in no mood to hear excuses, ordering a courier after Stewart to redirect his movements. Cheatham assured Hood that by extending Brown's right, Stewart's Corps would then be across the pike.
At 9 P.M., Hood retired to Oaklawn, the home of Absolom Thompson, with the impression that his orders to seize the pike were still being carried out. It wasn't until around 10 P.M., when Generals Stewart and Forrest awoke Hood, that he now realized that he and Cheatham had been operating under distinctly different battle-plans. Hood had seen the threat as coming from the South, where the bulk of the Union army had been cutoff from Spring Hill. Cheatham became focused on attacking the Union forces in Spring Hill, and had pulled back every man from the Columbia Pike to achieve this. Hood now sought to put some force across the vital pike and the Federal escape route by turning to his cavalry commander. Forrest assured him that he would do all he could if he were supplied much needed ammunition.
While the meeting between Stewart, Forrest and Hood was taking place, Ed Johnson's Division crossed the Rutherford Creek and went into bivouac to the left of Bate's Division. Just a short distance in Johnson's front, marched a long line of blue infantry, making a perilous night journey silently northward and through the teeth of Hood's trap.
Witness to this unbelievable sight was a barefoot, Confederate private, who made his way to Oaklawn around midnight. Hood was once more awakened and informed that the Yankees were moving up the pike. Orders were sent to Cheatham to advance to the pike and fire on the enemy there. Receiving the order, Cheatham sent word to Johnson's Division to be ready to advance. But after a reconnaissance at 2 A.M., the pike was found silent and empty. By that time, Schofield's entire force was in hurried flight towards Franklin and then onto Nashville.
Of the many rumors or mysteries that have long surrounded the events of Spring Hill, such as; Cheatham drank the evening away in the company of the local ladies, or that Hood was either drunk or in a state of drug induced euphoria, all have been debunked by modern historians with the exception of one. General Stephen D. Lee would write of Spring Hill: "...the responsibility rests on one not suspected. He was drunk, and it was not Cheatham either."
Hood, who had slept the night of November 29 at the nearby home of Absolom Thompson, expected to wake the next morning to find the outnumbered Federal army isolated and exposed in the open countryside outside of Spring Hill. Hood purportedly told a subordinate, "In the morning we will have a surrender without a fight."
Hood, still reeling from the shock of losing an opportunity he later described as "the best move of my career as a soldier come to naught," was understandably enraged the following morning. At breakfast with his subordinate generals he was described as being "wrathy as a rattlesnake." His officers were quarrelsome, denying guilt, and critical of each other. However, in the ranks of the common soldier a new resolve seemed to have emerged. One Confederate soldier wrote, "Each man felt a pride in wiping out the stain." Another wrote later, "Their spirits were animated by encouraging orders from General Hood who held out to them the prospect that at any moment he might call upon them to deal the enemy a decisive blow." Sergeant Major Sumner A. Cunningham wrote of the demeanor of Hood's troops in "Confederate Veteran" magazine in April, 1893, "...the march to Spring Hill, where the Federal retreat was so nearly cut off, a failure for which it was understood General Hood was not to blame, created an enthusiasm for him equal to that entertained for Stonewall Jackson after his extraordinary achievements...The soldiers were full of ardor, and confident of success. They had unbounded faith in General Hood, whom they believed would achieve a victory that would give us Nashville."
As author John P. Dyer so eloquently stated in his biography, The Gallant Hood, "The balm of revenge for wounded pride loomed large at Franklin."
Hood renewed his pursuit of the Federal army on the morning of November 30. Along the Columbia Pike from Spring Hill to Franklin the desperation of the fleeing Federal army was evident. Sergeant Major S. A. Cunningham recalled, "The next morning, as we marched in quick time toward Franklin, we were confirmed in our impressions of federal alarm. I counted on the way thirty-four wagons that had been abandoned on the smooth turnpike. In some instances whole teams of mules had been killed to prevent their capture."
Schofield had driven his men all night, arriving in Franklin at daybreak. Franklin, located approximately 15 miles south of Nashville, is situated on the south side of a horseshoe shaped bend of the Harpeth River. Finding the lone bridge across the river destroyed, and the river swollen due to recent rains, Schofield immediately began laying planks across the Railroad Bridge. The passing wagons and supplies were hurried across the bridge as quickly as possible, on toward Nashville. As infantry arrived, they were ordered to dig in, taking advantage of old breastworks constructed during the Federal occupation of the town two years earlier. Additionally, Union artillery was placed at Fort Granger, overlooking Franklin from a hilltop on the north side of the river.
Arriving at Winstead Hill, two miles south of Franklin, at about 2:00 P.M., Hood observed the situation. Sergeant Major S. A. Cunningham, standing near to Hood on the hill as Hood contemplated the attack, recalled, "The enemy were greatly excited. We could see them running to and fro. Wagon trains were being pressed across the Harpeth River, and on toward Nashville...but I was absorbed in the one man whose mind was deciding the fate of thousands. With an arm and a leg in the grave, and with the consciousness that he had not until within a couple of days won the confidence which his army had in his predecessor, he had now a very trying ordeal to pass through." Adding to Hood's dilemma was the fact that S. D. Lee's Corps, along with most of the Confederate artillery, had not yet arrived, having been used to feign a major Confederate attack at Columbia two days earlier. Hood later wrote that even had the artillery been available, he would not have used it extensively due to the proximity of civilian homes.
Many of Hood's subordinates advised against an attack. Cheatham, and reportedly General Patrick Cleburne, objected. The indomitable Forrest urged Hood, "Give me one strong division of infantry with my cavalry and I can flank the enemy." Forrest would have had to ford the rain-swollen Harpeth River, contend with the Federal artillery of Fort Granger overlooking the flank route, and move 2,000 infantry several miles in less than 3 hours of daylight to accomplish the flanking maneuver. Another of Forrest's many obstacles would have been Schofield's Union cavalry under the command of Gen. James H. Wilson, who would decisively defeat Forrest four months later at the Battle of Selma, Alabama, inflicting 2,700 Confederate casualties, while suffering only 319 Union casualties. (There is evidence that Hood considered a flanking movement. Author Sam Elliot writes in A.P. Stewart: Soldier of Tennessee that Hood is reported to have ordered Stewart to "send some cavalry and infantry to drive the Federals out of a bend in the Harpeth to the south of town, and to await further word.")
Battle of Franklin veteran L.A. Simmons wrote in his 1866 work, The History of the 84th Regiment Illinois Volunteers, "In speaking of this battle, very many are inclined to wonder at the terrible pertinacity of the rebel General Hood, in dashing column after column with such tremendous force and energy upon our center -- involving their decimation, almost their annihilation? Yet this we have considered a most brilliant design, and the brightest record of his generalship, that will be preserved in history. He was playing a stupendous game, for enormous stakes. Could he have succeeded in breaking the center, our whole army was at his mercy. In our rear was a deep and rapid river, swollen by recent rains -- only fordable by infantry at one or two places -- and to retreat across it an utter impossibility. To break the center was to defeat our army; and defeat inevitably involved a surrender. If this army surrendered to him, Nashville, with all its fortifications, all its vast accumulation of army stores, was at his mercy, and could be taken in a day. Hence, with heavy odds -- a vastly superior force -- in his hands, he made the impetuous attack upon our center, and lost in the momentous game. His army well understood that they were fighting for the possession of Nashville. Ours knew they were fighting to preserve that valuable city, and to avoid annihilation." Simmons added that the Federals quickly withdrew to Nashville after the battle as Franklin was "untenable." He also stated that with Schofield's corps absent from Nashville, the city was "scantily protected."
Hood pondered this most critical dilemma, and with only three hours of daylight remaining, decided to order an immediate frontal assault. As Cunningham later wrote, "While making ready for the charge, General Hood rode up to our lines, having left his escort and staff in the rear. He remained at the front in plain view of the enemy for, perhaps, half an hour making a most careful survey of their lines. It was all-important to act, if at all, at once. He (Hood) rode to Stephen D. Lee, the nearest of his subordinate generals, and, shaking hands with him cordially, announced his decision to make an immediate charge."
At Franklin, Hood was attempting to engage Schofield's 20,000 Federals before they reached Nashville to combine with Thomas's 20,000 additional troops. Hood knew that by morning Schofield's entire army would be inside heavily fortified Nashville, only 15 miles from Franklin. He had been sent into Tennessee by the Confederate government to conquer Nashville, and if he did not attack Schofield's 20,000 troops on the afternoon of Nov. 30, 1864, he would have to attack 40,000 Federals in much more heavily fortified Nashville at a later date. His choices were to attack a numerically equal Federal force immediately at relatively lightly fortified Franklin, attack a numerically superior force at more heavily fortified Nashville, or abandon the campaign. Hood perhaps also considered the fact that the Federals were certainly physically exhausted after the desperate overnight march from Columbia and frantic daylong construction of defensive works, while the Confederates had (unfortunately for them) slept the previous night in the fields north of Spring Hill, and were relatively well rested. With the plight of the Confederacy so precarious that Lee indeed surrendered 18 weeks later, Hood chose to attack at Franklin, the only time in his career that he ordered a massive frontal assault against fortified positions.
Stewart's Corps, arriving at Winstead Hill first, moved to the Confederate right, with Cheatham's Corps, marching behind Stewart, taking the central position for the assault, along the Columbia Pike. Cleburne's acclaimed division of Cheatham's Corps was positioned to the center, the obvious troops to confront the strongest portion of the Union lines. (The configuration of the Confederate units in the charge at Franklin has been falsely and absurdly accredited by some scholars to a desire by Hood to punish Cheatham and Cleburne for the failure at Spring Hill. Stewart's troops, arriving on the field first, were the obviously logical choice to be moved to the flank, given the urgency of timing. Cheatham's troops, arriving next, would take the center position. Some historians argue that Stewart's Corps could have screened Cleburne's division while it moved to the right. But with an open two miles to advance over, screening any movements would be pointless. Cleburne's division, the hardest-fighting, most experienced, and most successful of Cheatham's divisions, would logically be given the mission of assaulting the strongest portion of the Union line.)
At exactly 4:00 P.M., under clear skies and warm Indian Summer weather, 20,000 troops of Stewart and Cheatham's Corps charged the Federal lines at Franklin. After initially penetrating the Union lines near the Carter House along the Columbia Pike, the Confederates were pushed back to the outer Federal trenches. Ironically, the Union center was saved by the charge of Union Col. Emerson Opdycke's First Brigade of Wagner's Division. The pugnacious Opdycke had defiantly disobeyed orders by taking his exhausted troops to the rear of the Union lines for rest after they had been persistently assigned hard duty on the march from Columbia. Opdycke's charge saved the Union center, and set the stage for the slaughter of the Confederates in the outer trenches in front of the Carter House and the adjacent cotton gin house. These troops of Cheatham's Corps were trapped; not being able to advance, not being able to retreat across the open ground over which they had charged, and being under murderous enfilade fire from the salient in the Union line to their right at the gin house.
The Battle of Franklin raged into the night, ending around 2:00 A.M. The following morning the awful carnage was laid bare. The Confederates had suffered approximately 6,500 casualties, including 1,700 killed. Among the dead were six Confederate generals: Patrick Cleburne, Otho Strahl, Hiram Granbury, States Rights Gist, John Adams and John Carter. Also, General George Gordon was captured. Union casualties were approximately 2,500. By morning, Schofield had withdrawn his victorious army, now safely within the fortress of Nashville.
"Opdycke's Tigers" at Franklin, by artist Don Troiani
Read More In-Depth Account of the Battle of Franklin
None were more distraught over the carnage than Hood. On the morning after the battle, as Hood was inspecting the battlefield, one of his soldiers recalled, " His sturdy visage assumed a melancholy appearance, and for a considerable time he sat on his horse and wept like a child."
Although widely criticized for the decision to attack at Franklin, Hood also had defenders, including Jefferson Davis who wrote in his post-war memoirs, "Hood had served with distinction under Lee and Jackson, and his tactics were of that school. If he had, by an impetuous attack, crushed Schofield's army...we should never have heard complaint because Hood attacked at Franklin, and these were the hopes with which he made his assault."
Hood now pondered his next move. Thomas's Federal forces now totaled approximately 50,000, twice the strength of Hood's army, and were now within heavily fortified Nashville. Sherman was hundreds of miles away, soon to seize Savannah.
With few options Hood contacted Beauregard, inquiring into the possibility of obtaining reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi. On Dec. 2 Beauregard wired Jefferson Davis, "Cannot I send General E. Kirby Smith to reinforce General Hood in Middle Tennessee?...His assistance is absolutely necessary at this time." Beauregard further asked that if logistics prohibited troops from crossing the Union-controlled Mississippi River, could Smith launch an offensive demonstration into Missouri, thus keeping Federal forces in St. Louis and Memphis from reinforcing Thomas at Nashville. Receiving no reply, Beauregard again wrote to Smith, as did Confederate Secretary of War Seddon, but it was not until January 6, after the decisive Battle of Nashville, that Smith replied, stating that he could provide no assistance. Hood also requested reinforcements from other areas, specifically Breckinridge in western Virginia, and troops from Mobile. Both requests were denied by Richmond.
Hood certainly recalled his training at West Point where all cadets were taught Napoleon's Military Maxims. In nineteenth century warfare, these were considered to be the most fundamental of military tactics. Napoleon's Maxim Number 6 states: "When once the offensive has been assumed, it must be assumed to the last extremity. However skillful he maneuvers, a retreat will always weaken the morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy."" Franklin was, by the current literal definition of the time, technically a Confederate victory, since Schofield yielded the field to Hood and retreated. Although Hood knew that his casualties were high at Franklin, he also knew that he had inflicted substantial casualties on Schofield as well.
With few options, and hoping to receive either the requested reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi or a demonstration into Missouri by Kirby Smith, Hood proceeded on to Nashville. Stopping a few miles outside the city, there he constructed heavy defensive fortifications, including redoubts, with hopes of enticing Thomas to attack. Hood hoped that an assault by Thomas on heavy defensive fortifications could cripple the Federals and a successful Confederate counterattack could then be launched.
General U. S. Grant, extremely apprehensive at the threat of Hood's army outside of Nashville, on Dec. 6 ordered Thomas to attack. On Dec. 11, with Thomas still yet to obey the order, Grant sent the following urgent message, "If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio..." In fact, Grant left his army in Virginia and was actually en route to Nashville to personally supervise an attack by Thomas's forces on December 15th when he learned of Thomas's assault, telegraphing Thomas at 11:30 PM, "I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van Duzen, detailing your splendid success of today, I shall go no further."
After Union General A. J. Smith's troops arrived from St. Louis, Thomas's Federal forces in Nashville numbered some 70,000. Hood's army totaled only 25,000 ill supplied troops. On December 14 Thomas's Union forces swarmed out of Nashville and the Battle of Nashville began. After two days of fierce fighting, the Confederate left, anchored by Bate's division, came under a furious assault by the division of Union General John McArthur. Bate's troops broke and ran, and their hysteria was soon transmitted to the entire Confederate army.
On Dec. 16 the Army of Tennessee began its final retreat, retracing its route through Franklin, ultimately ending in Tupelo, Mississippi some two weeks later numbering approximately 18,000 infantry and cavalry. Casualties at Nashville are hard to ascertain, with the war ending so soon afterward. It is estimated that Confederate casualties at Nashville numbered approximately 500 killed and 1,000 wounded. However, Union records indicate over 13,000 prisoners held after the battle, many of whom were not captured, but seeing the futility of further resistance, simply surrendered. Confederate Private Sam Watkins wrote in his post war memoirs Company Aytch of the retreat from Nashville,"...more than ten thousand had stopped and allowed themselves to be captured." These mass desertions, which had been plaguing the Army of Tennessee since the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign months earlier, further reduced the number of retreating Confederate troops. S. A. Cunningham wrote, "By this time, nearly all the Tennesseans were gone home. They either had written furloughs or took 'French leave' (deserted)."
Read a More In-Depth Account of Hood's Retreat and a Casualty List (US and Confederate) of the Retreat
Hood resigned his command on January 23, 1865, reverting back to his permanent rank of lieutenant general. During the waning days of the Confederacy, Hood was ordered by Davis to travel to Texas and attempt to raise an army of 25,000 troops. However, learning of the surrender of Gen. Kirby Smith in Texas, Hood surrendered to Federal authorities in Natchez, Mississippi on May 31, 1865.
Hood's 1864 invasion of Tennessee has been severely criticized by many historians and authors. The defeats at Franklin and Nashville were certainly decisive; however, both the Confederacy and Hood had few other options at that late point in the war. General A. P. Stewart wrote afterward, "I deem it proper to say that after the fall of Atlanta the condition of the army and other considerations rendered it necessary, in my judgment, that an offensive campaign should be made in the enemy's rear and on his line of communications."
Dr. Samuel Mims Thompson, Chief Surgeon of the 41st Tennessee Infantry, wrote after the war, "Many, we know, will disagree with us, but we think to calmly and impartially view General Hood's course we will be forced to accord to him abilities of the highest order and a military commander with but few superiors." Thompson continued, "What became of General Hood for the remainder of the war we do not know, but if he was removed for failure in Tennessee, he was treated very unjustly. That he did so, we believe was no fault of his. He failed simply because he had not men and supplies to contend with the immense force that was against him."
In a letter to Davis dated December 25, 1864, Tennessee Governor Isham Harris, who had accompanied Hood on the invasion wrote, "I have been with General Hood from the beginning of this campaign, and beg to say, disastrous as it has ended, I am not able to see anything that General Hood has done that he should not, or neglected anything that he should have done which it was possible to do. Indeed, the more that I have seen and known of him and his policy, the more I have been pleased with him and regret to say that if all had performed their parts as well as he, the results would have been very different."
Only sixteen weeks after the Army of Tennessee's defeat at Nashville, Robert E. Lee would surrender the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox. A few weeks later the Confederate States of America would cease to exist. It has been said that desperate times call for desperate measures; such was the plight of the Confederacy in late 1864.
-- By Alethea D. Sayers --
Mason, TN
Sources:
- Dyer, John P., "The Gallant Hood" Konecky and Konecky, 1950
- Hood, J. B., "Advance and Retreat" Blue and Gray Press, 1985
- Davis, Jefferson, "The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. II"
Da Capo Press 1990
- Elliott, Sam D., "Soldier of Tennessee" LSU Press, 1999
- Southern Historical Society Papers, Richmond, VA
- Cunningham, S.A., Confederate Veteran Magazine, April 1893
